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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the relationship between employment status (agency workers vs. 
permanent employees) and affective and normative job and co-worker commitment. Our 
study was conducted on employees from four metal companies in the Netherlands. As HRM 
practices seem to influence employee commitment, we performed 89 interviews across all 
four companies and included blue-collar workers, their managers (direct supervisors, HR 
managers and production managers), as well as works council members. To test our 
hypotheses on commitment differences, we conducted quantitative research within the 
companies (permanent employees N = 167; agency workers N = 54), all of who were blue-
collar workers. Results show that permanent employees and agency workers express similar 
degrees of commitment to their job and to their co-workers, apart from affective commitment 
to co-workers, which is lower for agency workers than for permanent workers. We argue that 
national legislation, as well as managers‘ attempts to offer HR practices equal to those of 
permanent staff, play a prominent role in stimulating agency workers‘ commitment.  
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On the job and co-worker commitment of agency workers and permanent employees   
Much has been written about the consequences of agency work for employees and 
organisations. Authors such as Pfeffer (1994) and Rousseau (1995) assume that, without a 
permanent labour contract, the development of employee commitment and other desirable 
attitudes is wishful thinking. As a result, they assume that non-permanent employees‘ work-
related behaviour will suffer. However, research shows contradicting results: workers with a 
non-permanent employment status can develop commitment comparable to those of 
permanent employees (e.g., Pearce 1993) and their commitment can even exceed that of the 
latter (McDonald and Makin 2000). How can we explain these findings? A salient explanation 
is that there must be a ‗black box‘ between the labour contract/commitment link: other factors 
are obscuring a direct relationship. This paper focuses on one of these factors: HRM practices 
(e.g., Torka and Schyns 2007; Mitlacher 2008).  
 In this study, we concentrate on two commitment foci: the job and the co-workers. 
There are four reasons for us focussing on less abstract foci than the entire organisation. First, 
commitment can work upwards: proximate foci can influence abstract ones (e.g. Yoon, Baker 
and Ko 1994). Second, research shows that employees with lower hierarchical functions are 
committed foremost to their job (e.g. Gallie and White 1993), which is a fact of particular 
relevance for the population we deal with in this article, namely, blue-collar workers. Third, 
research indicates that commitment towards the entire organisation does not necessarily 
predict work-related behaviour or performance (see the next paragraph). Finally, meta-
analyses found that time is needed to build up commitment to something as abstract as the 
entire organisation (e.g., Mathieu and Zajac 1990; Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch and 
Topolnytsky 2002). However, the organisational ‗membership‘ of many agency workers is 
limited and shorter than those of permanent staff.   
Employment status and commitment 
4 
We will begin by highlighting the relationships between HRM practices and 
commitment. We will also elaborate on Dutch legislation for agency work since managers‘ 
freedom in shaping organisational conditions for agency workers is restricted by labour law 
and collective agreements. After a discussion of the method of this study, we will present the 
findings. Finally, we will draw conclusions concerning agency workers‘ commitment and 
companies‘ opportunities to manage non-permanent workers‘ attitudes and behaviour. 
 
Exploring HR practices as antecedents of job and co-worker commitment 
Many authors assume that employee commitment towards the organisation ultimately 
contributes to company performance (e.g., Beer, Spector, Lawrence, Quinn Mills and Walton 
1984). The interest in commitment displayed by scholars and practitioners is therefore not 
surprising. However, research challenges this idea, showing that organisational commitment 
is unrelated to (e.g., Somers and Birnbaum 1998) or has very little influence on job 
performance (e.g., Mathieu and Zajac 1990). Consequently, Benkhoff‘s (1997) and Becker, 
Billings, Eveleth and Gilbert‘s (1996) findings argue for using less abstract foci of 
commitment: they found that supervisor commitment had a stronger influence on 
performance than organisational commitment. Most research still focuses on affective 
commitment towards the entire organisation. Consequently, knowledge about other natures 
and foci of commitment, such as the ones we explore in this article, is limited (Meyer et al. 
2002; but see, e.g., Felfe, Schmook, Schyns and Six 2008). In general, commitment can be 
defined as ―a (mental) force that binds an individual to a course of action of relevance to one 
or more targets.‖ (Meyer and Herscovitch 2001, p. 302). Although Allen and Meyer (1990) 
distinguish between three types of commitment - affective, normative and continuance 
commitment - we limit our study to affective and normative commitment because research 
has shown that these two types of commitment predominantly predict the behaviour desired 
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by companies (e.g. Meyer et al. 2002). Affective commitment refers to emotional attachment. 
Normative commitment involves moral obligations.  
  Job commitment refers to the likelihood that an individual will continue working in a 
particular job because he or she feels psychologically attached to it (Rusbult and Farrell 1983, 
p. 430). Related constructs are job involvement and work involvement. According to Hackett, 
Lapierre and Hausdorf (2001, p. 394), job involvement tends to be a function of how much 
one‘s job can satisfy one‘s current needs. Work involvement reflects a normative belief about 
the value of work in one‘s life. Job commitment is not concerned with either the satisfaction 
of individuals‘ needs through the job (job involvement) or the importance of work in one‘s 
life (work involvement), but focuses on the question as to whether or not someone is attached 
to his/her job and why. Therefore, compared to job involvement, job commitment is more 
specific: it is concerned with the underlying nature of one‘s needs. An individual with high 
affective job commitment likes his/her job; an individual with high normative job 
commitment has certain norms and values towards the job, that is, he or she feels a moral 
obligation to perform well in a job.  
 Co-worker commitment refers to the likelihood that a worker feels psychologically 
attached to his/her colleagues. Affective co-worker commitment refers to a worker liking his 
colleagues and enjoying working with them. Normative co-worker commitment refers to 
‗collegiality‘, or, to put it differently, to the totality of internalized normative pressures to act 
in a way that meets co-workers‘ goals and interests (Wiener, 1982, p. 421).  
  
Organisational conditions for commitment: HR practices 
Work experiences correlate significantly and positively with affective and normative 
commitment to the organization (Meyer et al. 2002). Work experiences could be defined as 
everything the individual experiences in the work context. We can therefore link these 
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experiences to HR practices. Not only job characteristics and pay (e.g. Morris, Lydka and 
O‘Creevy 1993), but also development, promotion and training opportunities (e.g. Benson 
2006), as well as opportunities to take part in decision-making (e.g. Lincoln and Kalleberg 
1985), influence commitment positively. Consequently, we assume that HR practices serve as 
antecedents for both affective and normative commitment. Not much research has been done 
on the relationship between recruitment/selection and commitment. However, when taking 
into account the employment status, the dichotomy voluntary/involuntary seems an important 
predictor of commitment (e.g. Feldman, Doerpinghaus and Turnley 1995; Krausz, Brandwein 
and Fox 1995):  Are the workers doing temp work because they have no other possibility and 
see this as a stepping stone to get back into permanent work or did they chose this kind of 
employment because they prefer to be temp workers (see Torka and Schyns 2007; see also De 
Cuyper and De Witte 2008)?  
  In spite of the evidence for HR practices as antecedents of commitment, we have to be 
cautious with our assumptions. The above-mentioned research is solely focused on 
commitment towards the organisation. Several scholars point to the interference of potential 
multi-level problems in commitment research. This means that antecedents, as well as 
consequences of commitment, should be linked to appropriate commitment foci. For example, 
research shows that motivation has a significant positive relationship with occupational 
commitment, but not with organisational commitment (Wallace 1997). Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to assume that different HR antecedents may also impact commitment foci 
differently.  
Organisational conditions for agency workers: HR practices 
In contrast to regular workers, agency workers have to deal with two organisations: the temp 
agency and the user firm. This also means that agency workers have two suppliers of HR 
practices. Thus, two organisations share the responsibility for directing agency workers‘ 
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commitment. Research shows that the user firms‘ HR practices can influence the commitment 
towards the agency and vice versa (e.g. Connelly, Gallagher and Gilley 2007). Evidence 
suggests that agency workers have less attractive HR practices than permanent employees 
(e.g. European Foundation 2001; McGovern, Smeaton and Hill 2004). The logical assumption 
that agency workers‘ commitment and behaviour will suffer therefore seems plausible, as 
organisations seem to invest less into the drivers of agency workers‘ commitment. We need to 
take into account, however, the freedom that agency and user firms have in offering HR 
practices to agency workers, as it is restricted by national legislation and collective 
agreements. 
Despite the fact that European social partners had already proposed a directive for the 
regulation of temporary work in Europe in 1982, the directive was never officially negotiated 
at the sectoral level (Arrowsmith 2006) until now, due to differences of opinion on equality 
and terms and conditions of employment. This means that regulations and, as a consequence, 
working conditions for agency workers differ between European countries.  
 
Organisational conditions for agency workers: regulations in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands are the second largest user of agency work in Europe (2.5% of the total 
workforce, just behind the UK, with 4.5%; Eurociett 2007). On July 1
st
 1998, the Labour 
Market Intermediaries Act (WAADI) came into force. The WAADI abolished the licensing 
system (i.e., previously, permission was needed for running a temp agency) and a number of 
restrictions relating to placement, maximum duration (from a maximum of six months to an 
open-ended duration), worker redeployment, and limitations in the ability of agencies to 
obstruct agency workers from entering into direct employment contracts with user firms and 
others. Other rules remained, such as a prohibition on posting agency workers in user firms in 
which there was a strike, the dual responsibility of user firms and agencies for the payments 
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of social premiums and taxes, and, in contrast to, for example, the UK, an equal wages clause 
for agency workers. Additionally, sectoral level agreements between the agency employer 
organisations (in particular, the Algemene Bond Uitzendondernemingen (ABU), the 
Nederlandse Bond voor Bemiddelings- en Uitzendondernemingen (NBBU), and the 
Vereniging Payroll Ondernemingen (VPO)) and the unions were written. In January 1999, the 
Flexibility and Security Act came into force. The Act views the legal position of temporary 
employees as a standard labour contract between a temporary employee and the agency, and 
also introduces participation rights for agency workers in the user firm (Arrowsmith 2006).  
 In contrast to other countries (e.g. France and Italy), there are no restrictions in the 
UK, Germany and the Netherlands concerning reasons for agency worker use. Restrictions in 
other countries comprise of, for example, using temporary workers only for work limited to 
specific, non-permanent jobs that are not part of the firms usual work (e.g., Portugal and 
Spain) and for exceptional peaks of work (e.g., Belgium and Norway). This means, managers 
in the Netherlands are permitted to use agency workers for regular jobs and also during 
normal levels of activity. Therefore, Dutch companies have the opportunity to offer agency 
workers HR practices concerning job characteristics equal to those of permanent employees.   
 Furthermore, in contrast to other countries, there is no limit in the Netherlands on the 
duration of employing agency workers for the user company. In other countries, the limitation 
of the duration differs between eight (Greece) and twenty-four months (Portugal). This means 
that Dutch companies have more degrees of freedom than companies in other countries when 
it comes to their staffing practices for agency workers (Arrowsmith, 2006).  
 In the Netherlands, agency workers‘ tenure plays an important role with respect to the 
quality of HR practices for several reasons. First, the collective agreements between agency 
work employer associations and unions include provisions on training after a certain time 
period and a time-related remuneration scheme. Second, when an employee works 26 weeks 
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for the same user company, that client has to pay the agency worker the same wage and 
overtime rates as permanent employees in the company. Third, according to the Dutch law on 
works councils, agency workers with a length of service that exceeds 26 weeks of work for 
the same agency have a right to elect council members. After one year of service, they are 
eligible for election. Agency workers with a length of service that exceeds 24 months of work 
for the same user firm have a right to vote and are eligible for election on the user company‘s 
works council. Thus, for Dutch agency workers, tenure influences HR practices positively. 
The Dutch regulations, and more specifically, the possibility of an open-ended assignment at 
the user firm or the use of agency work for the firms‘ usual work, as well as the consequences 
of the equal pay act and the access to training, make the development of commitment in 
temporary workers that is comparable to permanent workers possible. We can therefore 
assume that the job commitment of agency workers will not differ from those of user firms‘ 
permanent employees: 
Hypothesis 1: Agency workers’ affective commitment towards the job is not different 
from those of permanent employees.  
Hypothesis 2: Agency workers’ normative commitment towards the job is not different 
from those of permanent employees.  
 
However, the link between HR practices and co-worker commitment needs to be explained 
further. We assume that agency workers and permanent workers will regard each other as 
more equal when they are treated equally by the organisation. As mentioned before, Dutch 
legislation makes this possible.  In particular, the opportunity for open-ended assignments can 
enhance the feeling of being real colleagues for both groups and increase the sense of 
commitment to each other. We know from prior research that longer-term cooperation adds to 
Employment status and commitment 
10 
the feeling of solidarity between co-workers (Koster 2005) and we assume this to be true for 
temporary and permanent workers as well.  
Hypothesis 3: Agency workers’ affective commitment towards co-workers is not 
different from those of permanent employees.  
Hypothesis 4: Agency workers’ normative commitment towards co-workers is not 




Company A and B produce recognisable final products. The companies share one HR 
manager: he works sixteen hours a week for company A and sixteen hours a week for 
company B. Company A has 164 employees with a permanent contract. 88 of these 
employees are low- to medium skilled fitters and welders. In addition, 78 so-called ‗flexible 
workers‘ were working for the company at the time of the research. These included agency 
workers, fixed-term employees, and hired hands (i.e., workers‘ ‗borrowed‘ from other 
companies). 62 of the 78 non-permanents worked in production. Company B employs 137 
permanent staff. 52 of the 137 staff members work as fitters and welders. The company had 
also hired 38 agency workers. 26 of the 38 were fitters and welders. Due to their seasonal 
products (summer vs. winter), company A and B have opposite peaks and troughs. In order to 
deal with these fluctuations, the companies exchange permanent employees. Company C 
produces a recognisable final product, but is also active in the process industry. 350 people 
work for the company. 50 of the190 manufacturing workers are agency workers. The workers 
are low- to medium skilled. Company D develops and produces hydraulic systems. 198 of the 
450 employees work in manufacturing; 80 of the 198 manufacturing workers are flexible 
workers. Formal vocational training in advance is not necessary, as the workers perform 
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simple assembly work. We included only agency workers and permanent staff in the 
quantitative study, excluding other forms of ‗flexible workers‘, such as employees with a 
fixed term contract. In the qualitative study, six employees with a fixed term contract 
participated. All of them used to be agency workers within the user firm. We conducted 
interviews with them because they can provide us with information from an insider‘s 
perspective: outlining differences between agency workers and company employees based on 
their own experiences. 
Qualitative study 
To gain knowledge on HR practices, semi-structured interviews were conducted. We 
interviewed fifty-four metalworkers (22 were permanent employees, 32 had a non-permanent 
employment relationship, including agency workers and employees with a fixed-term 
contract), twenty-one supervisors, three HR managers, six works council members, and four 
production managers. Dutch research had already shown that the commonly used instruments 
for measuring commitment are not suitable for low-educated employees (Peeters and Meijer 
1995), so another aim of the interviews was to derive questionnaire items. For this purpose, 
we asked the respondents two questions: What does commitment towards the job mean to 
you? And, what does commitment towards other colleagues mean to you? To gain knowledge 
on HR practices and possible differences between employees and agency workers, we asked 
the interviewees several questions, where each question was related to one HR practice. We 
asked managers the following: ―Could you describe the workers‘ job (including physical work 
conditions, relationships with colleagues and supervisors, opportunities for training, 
participation in decision making, and satisfaction with pay and benefits) and do you believe 
that the … (all the mentioned practices) of agency workers and permanent employees differ?‖ 
We asked the same question to the workers themselves, asking them to elaborate on the HR 
practices as they perceive them, as well as on differences between company employees and 
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agency workers. Additionally, we asked the HR and production managers about their motives 
for using agency workers.  
Quantitative study 
We conducted questionnaire research to test our hypotheses on the similarities in commitment 
between permanent and temporary workers. We designed instruments for affective and 
normative commitment to the job and co-workers based on the workers‘ answers to the two 
commitment questions in the interviews. Before distributing the questionnaire, we asked five 
workers from company A to check the items on clarity. In company A and B, the first author 
distributed and collected the questionnaire personally (i.e., walking the floor). In company C, 
the researcher held a presentation on the research for every team (in total 11) and then 
distributed the questionnaires. The company provided a box for the completed questionnaires. 
In company D, the HR manager distributed the questionnaire through the supervisors and a 
return box was installed in the canteen.  In total, 221 blue-collar workers (167 permanent 
employees and 54 agency workers) participated in the study (overall response rate: 47 per 
cent).  
The mean age for permanent employees was forty-one years; for agency workers, 
thirty-six years. The mean tenure at the user firm for agency workers with a permanent 
contract with the agency was 2.22 years. For those with a fixed-term contract with the agency, 
it was 1.04 years, and for agency workers with a so-called phase A, 0.63 years. Phase A 
applies to the first 78 weeks of work for the agency: the employment contract with the agency 
ends when the contract between agency and user firm ends. We treated agency workers as one 
group for two reasons. First, we had a limited number of respondents in the different contract 
groups: 13 with a phase A contract, 22 with a fixed-term contract, and 16 with a permanent 
contract with the agency. Second, we asked the respondents about their ‗continuous‘ tenure: 
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the length of their current assignment. Therefore, some of the participants may have a longer 
tenure overall, when the length of different assignments is added up.    
 
Results qualitative study: HR practices for agency workers and permanent employees 
compared 
Staffing 
Based on HR and production managers‘ answers, we can conclude that the companies use 
agency work for the following reasons: (1) to absorb fluctuations in demand, (2) to screen 
possible new employees, and (3) as a buffer for their permanent staff. The managers from 
companies A, B and D mentioned all three reasons. According to company C managers, 
reason one and three hold true, but the company does not have to deal with production peaks 
and troughs due to the long-term contracts with customers (between 10 and 15 years). In this 
company, short-term agency work is not possible because the product is very sensitive and 
subject to (international) law. All staff in Company C has to be screened by the Dutch 
Military Intelligence and Security Service. This procedure takes two months. Company A and 
B have seasonal peaks and troughs: six months peak and six months troughs. The fluctuations 
in Company D are more unpredictable.  
 All companies also use temp agencies as a supply pool for potential permanent staff. 
By using agency work, they can extend the legal probation period (one to two months). All 
companies strive to take over ‗good‘ agency workers. In company C, the decision to take over 
agency workers takes up to three years, except for excellent agency workers. After three 
years, three decisions are possible: those who perform badly have to leave; those who perform 
average get a permanent contract with the agency; and those who perform particularly well 
receive a permanent contract with the company.  
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 However, many agency workers prefer agency work over a traditional employment 
relationship. As a matter of fact, company A and B offered several agency workers a 
permanent contract, but these agency workers refused because they like being temps. 
According to some of the agency workers, they do not want a permanent contract with the 
company because they like the idea that they can leave whenever they want to, and because 
they like the fact that the agency would look for other assignments for them.  
 Finally, the buffer function of agency work in companies A, B and D has a particular 
history. Mass redundancies took place in the 1980s. The companies were forced to lay off a 
large percentage of their staff. This trauma, along with the negative reports of it in the media, 
is still remembered vividly by the managers. Therefore, even in times of low order volume, up 
to 40 per cent of the blue-collar workers have a non-permanent employment relationship. 
Some of the agency workers have worked for the same company for up to six years.  
 
Job characteristics 
According to the HR and production managers, the agency workers perform the same tasks as 
their colleagues with a permanent contract after an initial trial period. In company D, due to 
the unskilled, simple work, this period spans a few days to a few weeks. In the other 
companies, the period lasts up to several months for each manufacturing function. As 
mentioned before, only company D also uses short-term agency work (between a few days 
and a few weeks) and only these short-timers perform tasks of less quality than permanent 
staff.  
 Workers from all four companies are in favour of this equality in job characteristics 
between agency workers and company staff after the trial period. According to the workers, it 
is even possible that the task content of the work of agency workers is more enriched 
(including more challenge and variety) than that of the companies‘ permanent staff. Good 
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examples can be found in companies A and B. Some agency workers manufacture the whole 
final product, while some permanent employees ‗only‘ fit product parts. In company C, some 
agency workers have functions on a higher hierarchical level than company employees. The 
job characteristics are an additional reason why some of the agency workers in company A 
have rejected a permanent job offer. As mentioned before, company A and B exchange 
workers and accepting a permanent contract would mean that they have to work for company 
B during A‘s troughs. According to company A‘s agency workers, the job characteristics in 
company B are less challenging, which was also a reason for refusing a permanent contract 
with company A.  
 
Physical working conditions 
Differences in the physical work conditions appear to exist in all companies. In company A, 
new welders (all of them start as agency workers) do the so-called metre welding of vessels, 
that is, the physically most demanding work. However, since all new employees start with 
this task, differences are not a matter of contract, but of length of service. According to the 
managers, this is the only difference between agency workers and permanent staff. However, 
all workers mention more differences in physical work conditions. First, only short-term hired 
workers have to weld galvanised steel. Second, permanent employees have a better 
(equipped) work cabin than short-term non-permanent workers. Third, since the agency 
workers have to pay for their own working clothes, the state of their clothing is not as good as 
permanent employees, and this can lead to dangerous situations. Fourth, only employees with 
a permanent, fixed-term contract and long-term agency workers receive customized earplugs 
from the (hiring) company.  
 In company C, agency workers do not perform more demanding or boring tasks than 
company employees. Agency workers receive working clothes and other protective materials 
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from the company for free. One visible difference exists between agency workers and 
permanent employees: permanent employees wear a white name badge and agency workers a 
yellow one. Several supervisors, employees, and agency workers mentioned this as an 
‗unpleasant‘ difference. In company D, only short-term agency workers (up to a few weeks) 
perform more boring and physically demanding work. Only the short-timers have to pay for 
their work clothes and protective materials. They do not wear clothing designed for the 
company and therefore are recognisable as agency workers.  
 
Social climate 
The company staff and agency workers in all four companies state that they experience the 
same treatment. The agency workers ‗mix‘ with the companies‘ permanent staff during work 
and breaks. Some agency workers also meet their colleagues after hours. According to the 
agency workers, they receive the same friendly and respectful treatment from user firm 
supervisors and the managers as company staff. When departments organise informal 
meetings, agency workers are also invited. The supervisors and managers mention the 
importance of treating flexible and permanent staff equally in order to keep motivation high 
and a willingness to return on another occasion. 
 
Training (-on-the-job) and development  
In all four companies, agency workers mention that they receive the same opportunities for 
training-on-the-job through, for example, job enrichment and rotation, after the trial period. In 
company A, welders can switch to the fitting department and vice versa. In company B, 
company staff and agency workers assemble rather complex final products together. Thus, 
agency workers can learn the different steps necessary (including, for example, hydraulics, 
pneumatics and electricity) from company staff. Company C has semi-autonomous teams. As 
Employment status and commitment 
17 
in company B, company staff is used for knowledge and skills transfer to agency workers. In 
company D, ‗good‘ agency workers can also take part in the function rotation system. 
According to the HR manager, many permanent employees do not want to participate in 
function rotation and this has a positive impact on agency workers opportunities to receive 
training on the job.  
 All companies also finance training for long-term and/or ‗promising‘ agency workers. 
These are the agency workers whom the managers would like to offer a company contract. In 
general, the companies share training costs with the agencies and this co-financing sometimes 
leads to problems with the agencies, especially when courses are relatively expensive. 
Company B paid for three agency workers, one of whom preferred remaining in agency work 
over a permanent company contract.  
 
Pay and benefits 
In company A and B, former agency workers who are now employed by the company report 
that they earned between 150 and 250 Euro less as agency workers, although they performed 
the same functions. However, in both companies, some agency workers report that they earn 
200 Euro a month more than permanent staff. All of them are employed by agencies that are 
specialised in posting skilled technical workers. In company A and B, agency workers, in 
contrast to permanent staff, do not receive performance bonuses, or an end-of-year bonus (4 
per cent of the gross salary), or a so-called CO2 bonus (for welders) and they cannot take out 
an insurance for glasses and dentures. Furthermore, agency workers only receive overtime 
pay when they work more than 40 hours a week (permanent staff: more than 36 hours a 
week). Agency workers with a short tenure (up to six months) have to pay for their own work 
clothes. In company C, agency workers receive the same salary as their colleagues with a 
permanent contract, as well as an end-of-year and middle-of-year bonus, but only permanent 
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staff receives dividends. Concerning the salary, the manager urges the agency to pay the same 
salary that permanent workers receive. For all staff, more than 8.5 hours of work a day is 
considered overtime and paid as such. Agency workers cannot take part in the collective 
pension insurance and they do not receive 50 Euros for their birthday. The company, agency 
and the worker share costs for training. When the worker completes a course successfully, the 
user firm pays the worker his/her financial contribution back. Company D pays their 
permanent employees, as well as agency workers, a salary above the average of firms in the 
same sector. The company has to do so to attract and retain (agency) workers. A few years 
ago, after negative rumours had been spreading on the work floor regarding salaries, the HR 
department and the works council did research on the salary of agency workers. They found 
that other companies paid more. As a consequence, they increased the hourly salary. Contrary 
to the other companies, permanent employees in company D do not receive additional salary 
(dividends, end-of-year bonus, etc.).  
  
Employee influence 
All four companies have a works council. The works council members tried to interest long-
term agency workers in works council membership, but none of the agency workers 
responded. The works council has a right of consent (Instemmingsrecht) - the most far-
reaching right - on labour-related issues not regulated through a collective agreement. This 
means that the councils also (co-)decide on the use of flexible labour. Although works council 
members in company D question the amount of agency work, they, as well as council 
members in the other companies, support the use of agency work for the three reasons 
mentioned in the staffing section.  All interviewed workers mentioned that the works council 
is a good ‗invention‘, but they did not know the responsibilities of the council. In all 
companies, team meetings take place on a regular basis (2 to 4 times a month). The agency 
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workers usually participate and all managers state that they appreciate the agency workers‘ 
involvement. The managers see agency workers as having extensive knowledge from other 
companies that can be helpful. In company A, some agency workers participate in a quality 
circle. The company is building a new welding department and the welders can co-decide on 
the design.     
 
Results: Quantitative study: Testing for equality of affective and normative commitment 
towards the job and the co-workers 
 
Preliminary analyses 
Prior to testing our hypotheses, we conducted factor analyses in order to test for the 
dimensionality of our instruments. Appendix A and B depict the results of the factor analyses. 
This step was necessary to ensure construct validity, as the instruments were newly 
established from our qualitative work. We subsequently conducted reliability analyses for all 
instruments.  
Affective and normative job commitment. The instruments for the assessment of 
affective and normative commitment to the job consisted of five and eight items, respectively. 
A factor analysis revealed a clear two-factor solution using the scree-plot criterion. All items 
loaded sufficiently on their respective factor (affective versus normative commitment). The 
internal consistency for affective job commitment was α = .75. The internal consistency for 
normative job commitment was α = .87. 
Affective and normative commitment to co-workers. The instruments for the 
assessment of affective and normative commitment to co-workers consisted of eight and five 
items, respectively. A factor analysis revealed a clear two-factor solution using the scree-plot 
criterion. One item from the normative commitment instrument had to be deleted due to a low 
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factor loading. All other items loaded sufficiently on their respective factor (affective versus 
normative commitment). The internal consistency for affective commitment to co-workers 
was α = .91. The internal consistency for the four remaining items assessing normative 
commitment to co-workers was α = .85. 
 
Test of hypotheses 
We initially conducted four t-tests to test whether or not agency workers differ from 
permanent workers in their affective and normative commitment towards their work and their 
co-workers. 
Affective job commitment. The mean differences between permanent and agency 
workers were very small for affective commitment towards the job (Mpermanent = 3.58; Magency 
= 3.59). The t-test did not reveal any significant differences between the two groups (t (206) = 
-0.08; n.s.). 
Normative job commitment. Again, the mean differences between permanent and 
agency workers were very small for normative commitment towards the job (Mpermanent = 4.47; 
Magency = 4.44). The t-test did not reveal any significant differences between the two groups (t 
(210) = 0.46; n.s.). 
 Affective commitment to co-workers. The mean differences between permanent and 
agency workers were small but substantial for affective commitment to co-workers (Mpermanent 
= 3.66; Magency = 3.43). In this case, the t-test revealed a significant difference between the 
two groups (t (195) = 2.46; p < .05). We then checked whether or not the user firm tenure and 
department tenure influenced affective commitment towards co-workers by means of a 
regression analysis. This turned out not to be the case. 
Normative commitment to co-workers. The mean differences between permanent and 
agency workers were very small for normative commitment to co-workers (Mpermanent = 4.31; 
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Magency = 4.33). The t-test did not reveal any significant differences between the two groups (t 
(216) = -0.18; n.s.). 
 As t-tests test for differences and our hypotheses were expecting equality, we 
conducted equivalence tests to test for the equality of differences (Rogers, Howard and Vesey 
1993). The scales were transformed so that they had an absolute null-point, thus ranging form 
zero to four. The equivalence interval was defined as ± 10% of the mean of the permanent 
workers. 
Affective job commitment. The equivalence interval for affective commitment to job 
was δ1 = 0.26 and δ2 = -0.26. Following Rogers et al. (1993), we computed z-values for each 
δ, resulting in z1 = -2.39 (p < .01) and z2 = 2.22 (p < .05). Thus, our hypothesis was supported. 
Normative job commitment. The equivalence interval for normative commitment to 
job was δ1 = 0.35 and δ2 = -0.35. The z-values were z1 = -4.62 (p < .01) and z2 = 5.54 (p < 
.01). This supports our hypothesis. 
Affective commitment to co-workers. The equivalence interval for affective 
commitment to co-workers was δ1 = 0.27 and δ2 = -0.27. The z-values were z1 = -0.45 (n.s.) 
and z2 = 5.36 (p < .01). Thus, our hypothesis was not supported for affective commitment to 
co-workers.  
Normative commitment to co-workers. The equivalence interval for normative 
commitment to colleagues was δ1 = 0.33 and δ2 = -0.33. The z-values were z1 = -4.27 (p < .01) 
and z2 = 3.90 (p < .01). This supports our hypothesis. 
 
General discussion, limitations, and consequences 
The aim of this paper was to explore the relationship between employment status (agency 
workers vs. permanent staff) and affective and normative commitment towards the job and 
co-workers. We assumed on the basis of previous research that HR practices influence this 
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relationship. Results show that agency workers‘ affective and normative commitment to the 
job and their normative commitment towards co-workers do not differ from their colleagues 
with a permanent contract. Our qualitative research results show that agency workers perform 
the same tasks as their permanent colleagues in all companies, at least after the agency 
workers have completed an initial trial period. Furthermore, managers from all companies aim 
to minimize differences between permanent and non-permanent staff concerning other HR 
practices. This ‗equality‘ may explain the lack of differences in agency and permanent 
workers‘ commitment. However, with respect to pay and benefits, some differences seem to 
remain. For example, in company A and B, agency workers do not receive a substantial end-
of-the-year bonus. Since these differences seem not to impact affective and normative job 
commitment and normative colleague commitment, we assume that future research should 
take more care of potential ‗multi-level problems‘ when investigating antecedents and 
consequences of commitment. This means, when certain antecedents are not significantly 
related to certain commitments, these antecedents can still have an impact on other 
commitments.   
 Norms and values (normative job and co-worker commitment) hold up ‗even‘ in non-
permanent work-arrangements. This may especially hold true for those agency workers who 
experience agency work as a ‗stepping stone‘, namely, as an opportunity to gain a regular 
employment relationship with the user firm. When agency workers meet norms and values 
expected by the user firm they may be rewarded with a permanent contract.  
 We did find one significant difference between agency workers and permanent staff: 
the former have less affective commitment towards their co-workers than the latter. 
Regression analysis showed that user firm and department tenure have no significant 
influence. One possible explanation for this finding could be that a sense of security is a pre-
condition for building affective relationships. Although some agency workers have been 
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working for the user firm for years, they still have a realistic awareness that their arrangement 
with the firm can end from one day to the next. They are consequently cautious when 
investing emotionally in their colleagues. A comparable phenomenon has been noted in the 
research into so-called serial expatriates: they seem to be unable to build strong relationships 
with others (Richardson and Zikic 2007).   
This study has limitations. The study comprised of only cross-sectional data. A 
longitudinal design is needed to test whether tenure, HR practices, and/or changing 
employment status (from agency worker to permanent employee) really predict commitment. 
A further limitation was the restriction to one employee group (low- to medium skilled blue-
collar workers) in one sector (metal industry). Further research should be done with different 
and larger samples. Considering the importance of agency and user firm supervisors, we 
recommend that both be included in future research on the employment status-commitment 
link. Research on Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) shows that the quality of the relationship 
with the supervisor influences the delegation of challenging tasks, commitment, occupational 
self-efficacy, and performance (e.g. Dunegan, Duchon and Uhl-Bien 1992; Graen, Novak and 
Sommerkamp 1982; Schyns, Paul, Mohr and Blank 2005). Hence, supervisors from both 
agency and user firm are likely to impact commitment.  
 Notwithstanding these limitations, this study has implications for future research and 
practices. Authors who assume that agency work cannot be beneficial for agency workers and 
the user company in the long term seem to ignore research that supports the idea that the 
attitudes and behaviours of agency workers do not necessarily suffer. Automatically assuming 
a negative effect of agency work seems also to homogenise HR practices concerning agency 
workers: agency workers are not necessarily day labourers, used to accepting short-term 
fluctuations for unfair material and immaterial rewards. Some companies seem to understand 
that they are dependent on agency workers‘ effort for maximizing organizational efficiency 
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and are willing to invest in them with attractive HR policies. Therefore, user firms‘ decisions 
concerning the employment status are not an exclusive predictor of agency workers‘ attitudes 
and behaviours, although the overall treatment of non-permanent staff is. In addition, some 
agency workers voluntarily choose the ‗power of a potential good-bye‘ (Torka and Schyns 
2007). For this group of agency workers, a traditional employment relationship may include 
undesired outcomes. Finally, other countries can benefit from the Dutch experience, as Dutch 
national legislation for agency workers, in contrast to legislation in other countries, makes it 
possible to treat agency workers the same as permanent staff and offer them a long-term 
tenure within the user firm. These regulations do not restrict firms and allow HR practices that 
are positive for the development of agency workers‘ attitudes and behaviours. 
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Appendix: Factor analyses results 
A) Affective and normative commitment to the job 
Variance explained:  
Factor 1 36.89% 
Factor 2 17.97% 
Factor 3 7.25% 
Factor 4 6.82% 
 
Factor Loadings 
 Item Factor 1 Factor 2 
I like the job I do  .080 .780 
I perform my job with pleasure .009 .673 
Even if I would not need the money, I would remain in 
my job 
-.129 .583 
I‘m proud of my job .044 .706 
I do not like my job  -.060 -.400 
Providing craftsmanship is important to me .446 .142 
It is important to me to perform my job as well as 
possible  
.598 -.059 
I feel responsible for mistakes concerning the products 
I make 
.774 .047 
I feel responsible for the products I make 
.877 -.052 
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I feel responsible for product improvements  
.622 .187 
It is important to me to work neatly .750 -.026 
It is important to me to watch, for example, for 
mistakes and troubles while performing my job  
.769 -.055 
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B) Affective and normative commitment to co-workers 
Variance explained:  
Factor 1 35.91 
Factor 2 15.03 
Factor 3 7.73 




  Factor 1 Factor 2 
When I talk about my co-workers, I will more likely 
say ‗we‘ than ‗they‘ 
.566 .014 
I feel ‗at home‘ with my co-workers .782 -.108 
I like dealing with my co-workers  .788 -.059 
I talk with my co-workers about non-work related 
things on a regular basis 
.598 .011 
I also talk with my co-workers about private things.  .657 .008 
I associate with one or more of my co-workers in 
private life.   
.414 .018 
When my co-workers have private-life problems, I take 
it to heart.  
.564 -.011 
I‘m not really interested in my co-workers.  -.474 -.073 
Good cooperation is a sign of collegiality.  -.049 -.859 
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Helping each other is important to me -.056 -.857 
I believe relieving a co-worker of (too much) work is a 
good thing to do  
.083 -.689 
We are all responsible for the good running of daily 
business. 
.064 -.689 
Everybody is responsible for his/her own job and not 
for those of others.  
-.180 .077 
 
 
 
 
 
 
